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Admissibility of Evidence Obtained By
Unlawful Searches and Seizures
[ . W] e must consider the two objects of desire both of
which we cannot have and make up our minds which to
choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected,
and to that end that all available evidence should be used.
It also is desirable that the government should not itself
foster and pay for other crimes when they are the means by
which the evidence is to be obtained. ... We have to choose,
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.1
The above words, though pronounced by Mr. Justice Holmes
in dissent, set forth the spirit and purpose behind the doctrine
that evidence obtained through unlawful searches and seizures
is inadmissible in the Federal courts. This doctrine, first estab-
lished in Boyd v. United States,2 later repudiated in Adams v.
New York,3 and restored-with modifications-in Weeks v.
United States,4 represents the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the logical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment compre-
hends not only the prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures, but also prohibition of the use of the forbidden fruits of
evidence garnered by these unlawful procedures.
The Fourth Amendment was not conceived to be binding
upon the states, and every state except New York had a similar
constitutional provision. In New York this limitation on the
power of the state is found in the Civil Rights Law.5 In Vir-
ginia, Article I, Section 10 of the State Constitution provides as
follows:
General Warrants of Search or Seizure Prohibited.-That
general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
:116 U.S. 616 (1885).
'192 U.S. 585 (1904).
4232 U.S. 383 (1941).
a N.Y. Civil Rights Law §8 (1950).
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and
ought not to be granted.
Thirty-one states, including Virginia, have judicial rulings
in conflict with the Federal doctrine.6 The Virginia view was
pronounced in a lengthy opinion in Hall v. Commonwealth ex
rel. South Boston,7 with Mr. Justice West speaking for the Court.
His opinion stressed the following points:
(b) The provision of the Fourth Amendment, inhibiting
search and seizure by officers without a search warrant does
not prohibit the introduction against the accused of the
evidence procured in the course of the unlawful search. The
unlawful search is in itself a completed offense against the
constitutional rights of the accused, of which the introduc-
tion of the evidence forms no part. Its introduction is the
act of the court, and not the act of the offending party.
(c) An officer making a search without a warrant, or un-
der an illegal warrant is a trespasser, and not the repre-
sentative of the government. Nor is the introduction of the
evidence illegally obtained by him a ratification of his
illegal acts. Such evidence is of the same class as evidence
illegally obtained by a private citizen, which is held to be
admissible....
(d) The language used by the framers of the state and
federal constitutions clearly indicates that they intended to
protect persons, houses, and effects against illegal searches
and seizures by inflicting direct penalties upon the offend-
ing parties, and not by depriving the state or federal govern-
ment of its right to use evidence, otherwise competent and
pertinent, against those who have violated its penal laws.
(e) The law provides ample protection for the sanctity
of the home by inflicting a proper penalty, as in other cases,
upon the offending party in a direct proceeding instituted
for that purpose.8
Thus, although we find agreement in the thought that the
Fourth Amendment and similar provisions are desirable restraints
on governmental power, there is a great deal less than unanimity
• Table I, Appendix Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1948).
7 138 Va. 727, 121 §.E. 154 (1924).
8 Id. at 748, 121 S.E. 154, 160.
for the proposition that in order to endow these checks of
power with force and meaning, governments shall not use the
evidence obtained through their violations. As discussed by
Wigmore,9 the common law before Boyd v. United States o
considered the method whereby evidence was obtained to be a
collateral issue not to be determined by the court and not affect-
ing the admissibility of the evidence. Weeks v. United States"
decided that evidence unlawfully procured would be excluded in
the federal courts, provided the defendant made a formal motion
before trial for the return of the evidence seized, and thus the
illegality of the search and seizure was litigated before the trial
of the main issue. Wigmore disapprovingly comments, "The
point is that the fact of illegality of method in obtaining eviden-
tial materials is a collateral fact to the main issue; and all the
motions in the world will not make it anything else."1 2 Yet, there
are few who would challenge the wisdom of amending a pro-
cedural rule of law in the interest of preserving a constitutional
freedom.
In Wolf v. Colorado the Supreme Court in an opinion
rendered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment
-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in "the
concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause.13
The Court neverthless declined to treat its rule as to non-ad-
missibility "as an essential ingredient of the right,"14 holding that
the non-admissibility rule was a judicially created rule of evi-
dence and hinting that Congress might have power to negate it
by statute.15 Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented
vigorously, holding to the view that the rule against admissibility
is an intrinsic part of the Fourth Amendment, and that the
Fourth Amendment should be construed as applicable to the
the states through the Fourteenth. Justice Black likewise felt
'8 Wigmore, Evidence 5 (3d ed. 1940).
l°I16 U.S. 616 (1885).
12 232 U.S. 383 (1941).
11 8 wgmoe,,P oj'. ct. Vut nte 9. at 35.
" 338 UOs 25 .7 (1948). n
"Id. at 29.
"Id. at 33.
that the " . .. Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make
the Fourth Amendment in its entirety applicable to the states,"
but concurred with the majority opinion that the non-admissi-
bility rule was not a "command of the Fourth Amendment."
In attempting to appraise the conflicting views as to the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained through illegal searches and
seizures, the very presence of the Fourth Amendment in the
Constitution is of significance. It may be argued that a limita-
tion on the power of search and seizure is surplusage in an in-
strument creating a system of government which was to possess
only those powers expressly or impliedly granted by the people
to be governed. It is evident that the writers of the Constitution
attached paramount importance to the immunity from unreason-
able searches and seizures. The struggles in England against the
general warrantsl and in the colonies against the hated writs
of attachment were very much in the thoughts of those who
drafted the Bill of Rights. Those whose duty it is to interpret
and administer the Constitution should be as zealous to activate
the Fourth Amendment in its original spirit and intent since with-
out such affirmative enforcement the amendment is reduced to a
mere form of words.
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right
to be secure against such seizures is of no value, and, so far
as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.' 7
Hall v. Commonwealth,18 the basic Virginia case, observed
that the state has fulfilled its duty to its citizens under Article 1,
Section 10 of the State Constitution in providing the usual civil
and criminal remedies to the injured party. The inadequacies of
these remedies are dealt with by Mr. Justice Murphy in his
dissent to Wolf v. Colorado.19 Not only are the remedies inade-
quate to the injured party, but as a deterrent to would-be vio-
lators they are practically speaking, non-existent.
1s Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 97 Eng.Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765).
1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1941).
1 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154 (1924).
19338 U.S. 25 (1948).
The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists
to deter violations of the search and seizure clause. That
is the rule which excludes illegally obtained evidence. Only
by exclusion can we impress upon the zealous prosecutor
that violation of the Constitution will do him no good. And
only when that point is driven home can the prosecutor be
expected to emphasize the importance of observing con-
stitutional demands in his instructions to the police.20
It is stated in the Hall case that the Fourth Amendment
does not expressly prohibit the admission of evidence obtained
by illegal searches and seizures.21 This, of course, must be con-
ceded. But manifestly the Fourth Amendment was not intended
to provide a remedy for the breach but to establish a rule of
conduct for the agents of government. The non-admissibility
rule removes the incentive for the breach, while the so-called
remedy neither protects the right nor cures the breach.
What interpretation of the laws of agency would convert an
officer making an unlawful search and seizure into a "trespasser
and not the representative of govermment? 22 Is he on a "frolic
of his own"? Note that the evidence is offered not by an indi-
vidual, but by the police agency for which the illegal acts were
performed, and in whose employ the guilty party usually remains.
It can be strongly argued that this is indeed ratification of the
illegal acts.
It has been said: "Tnat the rule of exclusion and reversal
results in the escape of guilty persons is more capable of demon-
stration than that it deters invasions of rights by the police."2 3
But to this Mr. Justice Frankfurter replied: "'This court has re-
jected the notion that because a conviction is established on
incontestable proof of guilt it may stand, no matter how the
proof was secured." 4
The rule against admissibility has the merits of simplicity
of interpretation and precision of application. A comparatively
recent case demonstrated the need for such a criterion and also
20 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1948).
21 138 Va. 727, 748, 121 S.E. 154, 160 (1924).
"Id. at 749, 121 S.E. 154, 161.
,Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
"id. at 148.
gave a hint concerning the possible future development of the
law. In Irvine v. CaliforniaW5-a case in which the police secretly
made a key to the accused's front door, installed a microphone in
his home by the use of the key and the boring of a hole through
his roof, and entered the house twice more to move the micro-
phone, first into the defendant's bedroom, and later into his
bedroom closet-the Court found the action of the police "almost
incredible,"26 had the police themselves not admitted it. Yet
the Court refused to enlarge the Wolf doctrine so as to make the
non-admissibility rule binding upon the states, holding:
Now that the Wolf doctrine is known to them, state courts
may wish further to reconsider their evidentiary rules. But
to upset state convictions even before the states have had
adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the rule would be
an unwarranted use of federal power.27
The Court divided five to four on this case, with Justice Jackson
writing the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Reed and Minton joined. Justice Clark concurred in a
separate opinion, and Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and
Burton dissented.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clark stated that had
he been on the Court in 1949 when the Wolf case was decided,
he would have applied the Weeks doctrine to the states. He ex-
plained:
But the Court refused to do so then, and it still refuses to-
day. Thus Wolf remains the law and, as such, is entitled to
the respect of this Court's membership.
In the light of the "incredible" activity of the police here,
it is with great reluctance that I follow Wolf. Perhaps strict
adherence to the tenor of that decision may produce needed
converts for its extinction. Thus I merely concur in the
judgment for affrmance.28
t8347 U.S. 128 (1954).
'Id. at 132.
2 Ild. at 134.
3s Id. at 138, 139.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the
ground that the evidence against the accused was used in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment in that he had bought a federal
wagering tax stamp and the information he thereby gave to
the Federal Government was used against him by the California
authorities.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Burton, dis-
sented on the ground that the actions of the police in this case
fell within the area prohibited by Rochin v. California2 9 as vio-
lative of due process of law, quoting the opinion in that case that
"Due Process of Law, as a historic and generative principle, pre-
cludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of con-
duct more precisely than to say that conviction cannot be
brought about by methods that offend a 'sense of justice."' 30
The Irvine case, then, is one in which the actions of the
police were described by the highest court of the land as "in-
credible." Mr. Justice Douglas said they "smack of the police
state."31 Four members of the Court dissented outright, and one
went along "with great reluctance," with the final result that the
judgment of the court was one which a majority of the mem-
bers considered something to be desired; yet it became the rul-
ing of the Court because the dissenters could not find common
ground for dissent.
Incorporation of the non-admissibility rule into the Fourth
Amendment and of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth
would remove the need for nice inquiries into the question of
due process of law and provide an easily discernible guidepost
for all concerned. Convictions procured by evidence gained
through illegal searches and seizures should be considered in vio-
lation of due process of law-in whatever jurisdiction they occur.
Corrective action on this subject, as an important matter of public
policy, should commend itself to state legislators in those juris-
dictions such as Virginia, where the rule favoring admissibility
prevails.
"342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"Id* at 173.
32 347 U.S. 128. 139 (1954).
The rule requiring exclusion would have a salutary rather
than a deleterious effect upon law enforcement agencies. Sub-
jected to the public demand for apprehension and conviction of
wrongdoers, and yet restricted by the constitutional injunction,
police departments may be expected to improve their training
and operation through modernization, enlargement, and greater
adoption of scientific methods. The net result would be a more
efficient police force, a higher percentage of convictions, and the
enhanced respect of the citizenry toward the police and the law.
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